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ARGUMENT 
REPLY TO BRIEF FOR ATLAS TITLE 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Statement of Facts in the Brief for Appellees Atlas Tile Insurance 
Agency, Randy Kidman and Dave White (hereinafter "Atlas Brief), recites many 
facts were disputed by plaintiffs in their response to the summary judgment motion 
and states that they were undisputed, but this is clearly not the case. In addition, 
the Atlas Brief suggests inferences from other facts that were not presented in their 
motion or in the facts presented to the trial court. 
The court must view all facts and inference in the light most favorable to the 
non moving party. Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred, 182 P.3d 337 (Utah 2008). 
Contentions of the party opposing the motion must be considered in a light most 
advantageous to him and go to trial. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harriman. 
413 P.2d 807 (Utah 1966) 
The Atlas Brief also includes facts that were not part of its Statement of 
Undisputed Facts. Rule 7(c)(3)(A) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
that "memorandum supporting a motion for summary judgment shall contain a 
statement of material facts as to which the moving party contends no genuine issue 
exists." The facts are required to appear in the initial memorandum. Some of 
these additional facts were presented in an affidavit in support of the reply 
l 
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memorandum to the motion for summary judgment. However, a reply 
memorandum is limited to rebuttal matters raised in the memorandum in 
opposition. When a party first raises an issue in his reply memorandum, it is not 
properly before the trial court, and the appellate court will not consider it for the 
first time on appeal. Soriano v. Graul. 186 P.3d 960 (Utah 2008) 
The following facts, as recited in the Atlas Brief, were dispute by petitioner 
in their reply to summary judgment motion, were not part of the undisputed facts, 
or are inferences not made in the original motion: 
[T]he Hardings sold the Initial Property 
to Pecan Ridge Partners for the sum of 
$1.15 million (Atlas Brief, 2) 
The Hardings did not provide Atlas 
Title with written recording instructions 
regarding the recording of the trust deed 
against the Initial Property (Atlas Brief, 
3) ' 
Through inadvertence, Atlas Title did 
not immediately record the Harding's 
trust deed in second lien position on the 
Initial Property (Atlas Brief, 3). 
[A]fter confirming that the trust deed 
was not recorded, Atlas Title 
immediately recorded the Harding's 
trust deed (Atlas Brief, 3). 
There were several options available to 
Atlas Title to remedy the issue. (R. 
404.) Among other things, these 
included working with the two investor 
This not correct, as there was other 
consideration (R, 362). 
Plaintiffs did provide recording 
instructions (R, 362-3) 
The Atlas Defendants provided no 
evidence that the failure to record was 
inadvertent, and plaintiffs provided 
substantial circumstantial evidence that 
it was not inadvertent (R. 363-5) 
The Atlas Defendants did not provide 
any evidence that they immediately 
recorded deed, and the plaintiff 
provided evidence that the deed was not 
recorded for several weeks after it was 
brought to Atlas' attention that the deed 
was not recorded. 
None of these facts were part of the 
"Statement of Undisputed Material 
Facts" that were part of Atlas's Title's 
motion for summary judgment (R. 115-
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groups recorded in front of the Hardings 
to subordinate their trust deeds to the 
Hardings. (R. 404.) Atlas Title could 
also have tendered the matter to Stewart 
Title Guaranty Company, which 
provided a lender's policy of title 
insurance on the Initial Property. (R. 
404.) The Hardings did not insist on 
Atlas Title taking either of these or any 
other actions to remedy the mistake. (R. 
404.) (Atlas Brief, 4). 
Thus, after reconveyancing, property 
exchanges, and recordings of the new 
trust deeds, the Hardings ended up with 
a second position trust deed on the Final 
Property -exactly where they intended 
to be all along. 
120). Rather, they appear in a an 
affidavit filed with their reply 
memorandum. However, facts 
presented by plaintiffs dispute these 
issues. First, Atlas Title never provided 
a copy of the Stewart Title policy, or 
any other closing documents, to 
plaintiffs. Plaintiffs requested in 
discovery that Atlas Title admit that 
insurance had been provided and that a 
copy of the policy be provided. Atlas 
Title denied that there was insurance, 
and did not provide a copy of the policy 
in discovery (R, 363). Plaintiffs could 
not seek redress under the title 
insurance, when Atlas Title denied that 
there was such insurance and refused to 
provide plaintiffs with a copy of the 
policy. 
This statement suggests that the plan 
was for the plaintiffs to be subordinated 
in this position on the Final Property all 
along. There is no statement of fact to 
that effect in Atlas Title's "Statement 
of Undisputed Material Facts." (R, 115-
20), and that inference should not be 
drawn. In fact, the Hardings stated that, 
as part of their opposition to the motion 
for summary judgment, that the only 
reason they agreed to a second 
subordination agreement was that their 
original security interest was destroyed 
by Atlas Title (R, 367). They intended 
to be paid in full on the original note 
when the property transfer took place 
(R, 367). Atlas's neglect prevented this. 
The Hardings would have been able to 
cure any default on the original trust 
deed, but it was not worth it on the 
Final Property - not only was the 
3 
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property worth less, but the trust deed in 
superior position had almost double the 
principle balance (R, 214, 298, 367-8). 
The Hardings did not intend for the 
original note to be in second position on 
a less valuable property with a larger 
trust deed in first position. 
B. CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES 
The respondent's basic argument is that the plaintiffs were not harmed by 
Atlas Title's admitted negligence in not recording the Harding's initial trust deed, 
making the damage "completely hypothetical." (Atlas Brief, 17). 
However, the Hardings would never have agreed to take a second position 
on the "Final Property", but for Atlas Title's neglect. As stated by the plaintiffs in 
their opposition to the motion for summary judgment: 
1. The Hardings only agreed to sign the reconveyance in April of 2008, 
reference in paragraph 15 of defendant's facts, and not receive payment in 
fall of their trust deed on the Initial Property because their security interest 
in the Initial Property had been ruined by Atlas Title's failure to record their 
trust deed. They would not have done so had Atlas Title recorded their deed 
properly. 
2. If the Harding's trust deed had been recorded properly on the Initial 
Property and Pecan Ridge had gone in default on the trust deed in first 
position, the Hardings had made arrangements to cure the first trust deed. 
However, due to Atlas Title's failure to record the Harding trust deed, there 
was not sufficient value in the property to cure the first, second and third 
trust deeds then in place on the property. 
3. Because the Hardings trust deed had basically become worthless due 
to the actions of Atlas Title, they agreed to reconvey. They knew that Pecan 
Ridge was in trouble. The Hardings were no longer getting full payment on 
either of the trust deeds, and their security for their original trust deed was 
ruined by Atlas Title. Scott Wilson and Scott Neilson told Lynn Harding 
that Pecan Ridge would go under if the reconveyance was not done. 
4 
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4. Scott Wilson told the Hardings that Pecan Ridge had a deal set up to 
receive $1,000,000, which would be used in part to complete the Hardings 
new home, from the school board for part of the property Pecan Ridge was 
acquiring from Ash Creek (the "Final Property), and that the Hardings had 
to do the reconveyance so that Pecan Ridge could transfer the Original 
Property to Ash Creek in exchange for the Final Property. 
5. The Hardings are not sure if Pecan Ridge received the $ 1,000,000, 
but the home was not completed and the Hardings never received their new 
home and property they has been promised. 
6. When the "Final Property" went into foreclosure the Hardings were in 
second position, but the first position was $625,000. See defendant's 
exhibit 20. It was just a raw piece of ground, and not worth that amount 
[citations to the declaration omitted] (R, 367-8). 
The above facts were given as part of the Statement of Additional facts, provided 
in plaintiffs opposition to the motion for summary judgment.1 
From this, it is apparent that the failure to record the deed completely 
destroyed the value of their first trust deed. They would have been paid in full on 
that original note upon the Final Property being acquired. They only agreed to 
take an interest in the Final Property as their trust deed on the original property 
was now valueless. 
Atlas Title argues that the general economic problems in the economy 
resulted in the loss (Atlas Brief, 18). However, there are at least two problems 
with this theory. First, the plaintiffs trust deed on the second property did not 
have as much equity as their deed on the original property. The Final Property 
was worth less than the original property (R, 368), and the trust deed in first 
Rule 7(c)(3)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party in their opposing memorandum to set forth 
"additional facts." 
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position on the original property was substantially smaller than the trust deed in 
first position on the Final Property (Atlas Brief, 3, 5). 
Also, and more importantly, but for Atlas Title's neglect, the plaintiffs 
would have been paid in full on the original trust deed when the property transfer 
took place (R, 367) - before the worst of the Washington County property woes. 
The plaintiffs would not have agreed to obtain another trust deed rather than being 
paid in full, but for the neglect of Atlas Title in recording their trust deed (R. 367). 
Atlas Title argues that, despite the direct evidence presented by plaintiffs, 
that the plaintiffs would have taken second position on the Final Property anyway. 
This is speculation, and Atlas Title presents no evidence on this point. 
Atlas Title makes much of Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co.. 104 
P.3d 1185 (Utah 2004), where plaintiff, while perhaps trying to avoid a 
protuberance in the road, ran into a gap, causing him injury. The court held that 
the protuberance was not the proximate cause of the injury. The court stated that: 
[T]he protuberance was no more a cause of Mr. Goebel's accident than his 
decision to ride his bicycle that day, or the weather. After reviewing the 
evidence, we agree with the trial court and Southern that Mr. Goebel could 
have steered his bicycle into the gap regardless of whether the protuberance 
existed at all. 
The case is complicated by a variety of issues, none of which are mentioned by 
Atlas Title in its brief, including the fact that the plaintiff could not remember the 
incident, and that the defendant could only be found liable for the protuberance 
6 
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and not the gap. Causation was speculative because the plaintiff could not 
remember why he went in the gap. In the present case, the plaintiffs obviously 
remembered the failure to record the deed, and they have presented direct evidence 
that their failure to be paid in full for the first trust deed was due entirely to Atlas 
Title's negligence. No such evidence was presented, or could have been 
presented, in Goebel. 
Likewise, the evidence presented by plaintiffs in this case is much more 
direct, and much less speculative, than in any of the other cases cited by Atlas 
Title. 
C. CAUSATION AND SPECULATION ABOUT OTHER 
ACTIONS THE HARDINGS COULD HAVE TAKEN 
Atlas Title's next argument is that the plaintiffs should have either taken 
other actions to protect themselves. Atlas Title raises many possibilities, most of 
which were not raised at the trial court. 
For example, Atlas Title argues that the plaintiffs should have requested 
personal guarantees from the Pecan Ridge partners. This argument should not be 
considered by this court. Atlas Title would have the court speculate that (1) such 
personal guarantees had value, (2) the partners would have agreed to this, and (3) 
the Harding did not actually request this. Atlas Title's statement of facts did not 
state that the plaintiffs did not make this request, and any inference from the facts 
must be made in favor of the plaintiffs. Allred ex rel. Jensen v. Allred. 182 P.3d 
7 
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337 (Utah 2008) 
All of the supposed fixes by Atlas Title in its brief suffer from the same 
problems. This court is asked to speculate that the creditors who benefitted from 
Atlas Title's negligence would have cooperated to reduce the value of their 
interests. Atlas Title asks this court to find there is no proximate cause for failing 
to take actions which were most likely futile. 
Atlas Title is principally relying on Mahmood v. Ross. 900 P.2d 933 (Utah 
1999) in this argument. Mahmood is a contract case, The defendant had 
contracted to pay a certain amount to a third party on behalf of plaintiff, and failed 
to make the payments. The third party eventually foreclosed on some property 
owned by plaintiff. However, it appears that the foreclosure took place, not 
because the defendant failed to make the payments, but because a balloon payment 
to the third party was not made by the plaintiff. The court decided that the 
plaintiff could have refinanced the debt to the third party, or sold the property. 
The failure of the defendant to make the payments was not the direct cause of 
plaintiffs problems; rather, it was the failure to make the balloon payment. The 
court indicates that the failure of the defendant to make its payments may have 
made the refinance more difficult, but the court specifically found that there was 
no evidence presented that the missed payments made the refinance impossible. 
With that in mind, the holding of Mahmood is unremarkable. There was 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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essentially no evidence that the defendant caused plaintiffs damages. 
The situation in this case is quite different. It is clear that Atlas Title, by its 
neglect, completely destroyed the value of the plaintiffs security interest in the 
original property (R, 367). Plaintiff should have been in second, rather than 
fourth, position on the property, and would have been in a position to cure the 
trust deed in first position if the deed had been properly recorded (R, 367). 
Plaintiffs intended that they would be paid in full on their full trust deed at the 
time of the acquisition of the Final Property (R, 367). 
In Mahmood, there was no evidence that he could not refinance. In this 
case, the Atlas Title's neglect completely destroyed the value of plaintiff s security 
interest. Foreclosure on the trust deed would have been futile. 
While Atlas Title here speculates about various actions that plaintiff could 
have undertaken, most of which seem extremely unlikely to succeed, the most 
direct way the plaintiffs had to collect their debt - foreclose on the lien - had 
become pointless. The plaintiff in Mahmood could still have sold or refinance the 
property in question in that case. Plaintiffs here had no realistic options, as the 
value of their security had been entirely destroyed. 
Essentially, the plaintiff in Mahmood was not put in his position by the 
defendant's wrongful act. What caused his damages was his failure to make the 
balloon payment, not the failure of the defendant to make the payments. In this 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case, it was Atlas Title's neglect that forced plaintiff to accept a second trust deed 
on the Final Property. In Mahmood. it appeared entirely likely that the plaintiff 
would have lost the property regardless of whether the defendant had made his 
payments. Here, the evidence is clear that plaintiff would, absent Atlas Title's 
neglect, have been paid, at least in part, on their first trust deed (R, 367). That is 
fundamentally why Mahmood does not apply to in this mattter; the defendant 
didn't cause plaintiffs damages in that case, but that causation is clearly 
established here. 
D. SUMMARY JUDGMENT BURDENS 
Atlas Title next argues that the burden has shifted to the plaintiff to show 
causation. Plaintiff did provide evidence in its reply to the motion for summary 
judgment, in the form of its "Statement of Additional Facts" (R, 367-8), which 
establish causation, as well as the statements regarding Atlas Title's failure to 
disclose information about the title policy in their "Statement of Controverted 
Facts" (R, 362-3). These facts all relate to causation, including Mahmood's 
"impermissible speculation" issue. 
REPLY TO BRIEF FOR LARKIN AND WILSON 
A. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Larkin and Wilson do not include the disputed facts in their 
statement of facts, but do fail to include the facts in plaintiffs' Statement of 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Additional Facts from their memorandum in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment (R. 367-8). 
B. OTHER CLAIMS FOR RELIEF 
Defendants Larkin and Wilson claim that plaintiffs have not set forth any 
claim against them individually other than civil conspiracy. However, the 
complaint includes defendants generally in every cause of action, including the 
breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing (R, 59-62). Defendants 
Larkin and Wilson requested summary judgment only on the civil conspiracy 
claims (R, 347). They did not seek summary judgment on any of the other claims 
in the action, and did not seek summary judgment on the proximately cause issue 
either. Strangely, the court not only granted Defendants Larkin and Wilson 
summary judgment on the civil conspiracy claim, but also on "all claims," which 
Defendants Larkin and Wilson did not request (R, 457). 
Providing the plaintiffs prevail on the proximate cause issue, the remaining 
claims against the Larkin and Wilson defendants (other than civil conspiracy) 
should be remanded to the trial court. The trial court may have dismissed the 
other claims, but it could only have done so on the issue of proximate cause, as 
that was the only issue raised before the court. 
C. PROXIMATE CAUSE 
In regards to the proximate cause issue, plaintiff incorporates herein their 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
response to the Atlas Brief above. 
Regarding the specific cases discussed by Defendants Larkin and Wilson, 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises. 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) involves a third party 
criminal act. There was no showing that even if the defendant had done more to 
protect the plaintiff, that the crime would not have occurred. As discucussed 
above in relation to Mahmood. there is no such breakdown in causation in the 
present case. Absent the failure to record the deed and the recording of deeds in 
superior positions to plaintiffs (which Larkin and Wilson participated in), 
petitioners would have been paid on their first trust deed. 
Defendants do not discuss the facts of the case in Godeskv v. Provo City. 
690 P.2d 541 (Utah 1984). The plaintiff worked for a roofing company and 
received a shock from a power line. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs 
neglect was the proximate cause of his injury. The Supreme Court held that: 
An intervening negligent act does not automatically become a superseding 
cause that relieves the original actor of liability. The earlier actor is charged 
with the foreseeable negligent acts of others. Therefore, if the intervening 
negligence is foreseeable, the earlier negligent act is a concurring cause. 
The defendants in the present case, as in Godeskv. should be allowed to raise their 
arguments about what the plaintiffs should have done, and the effects of the 
slowing economy, when the deed did not get recorded. But it is not grounds for 
summary judgment. 
In Ostler v. Abina Tranfers Co.. Inc., 781 P.2d 445 (Utah 1989), the 
12 
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plaintiff complained that the trial court did not order a directed verdict on the issue 
of proximate cause. The issue was decided by the jury, as it should be tried in this 
case. It was not decided on the basis of summary judgment. 
Steffensen v. Smith's Management Corp., 820 P.2d 482 (Utah App. 1991) is 
another case where a plaintiff is seeking to recover damages due to the criminal 
activity of a third party. The trial court had granted a directed verdict on the issue, 
but the appellate court appeared to disagree with this conclusion. The trial court 
found that there was substantial evidence which indicated that the injuries were 
proximately caused by the defendant. However, the case was ultimately affirmed 
because the appeals court, interepreting other actions of the jury, found that the 
jury must have found that the case lacked proximate cause, and therefore the trial 
court's incorrect ruling was harmless error. This case does not support 
defendant's position; in fact, it stands for the proposition that such a case should 
be heard by a jury. 
The case is similar to Cruz v. Middlekauff, 909 P.2d 1252 (Utah 1996), also 
discussed by defendants. Even a third party criminal actor does not necessarily 
break the link of causation. 
In Thurston v. Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 83 P.3d 391 (Utah 
App. 2003), the cause of the plaintiffs injury was completely unclear. He was 
found dead and naked in his car with a blood alcohol level of .22. It was unclear if 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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he had committed suicide or been placed in the vehicle. Given that it was unclear 
how the injury had occurred, it is not surprising that Thurston was one of the rare 
cases where summary judgment on the issue of proximate cause was appropriate. 
The plaintiff could not establish a causal connection, something which can easily 
be done in this case. 
It is striking how the Atlas Title and Larkin and Wilson defendants all rely 
on cases (Goebel and Thurston) regarding causation where the plaintiff cannot 
prove causation as he was either dead or unconscious. Establishing that there is 
no proximate cause by summary judgment is obviously not an easy task. 
Essentially, the plaintiff was unable to say why he was injured, in contrast to the 
instant matter where the failure to record the trust deed, and the recording of 
additional deeds, destroyed the plaintiffs' security interest in the original property. 
Ingram v. Salt Lake City. 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987), is a government 
immunity case, and proximate cause is not the issue. 
In Kilpatrick v. Wiley, 909 P.2d 1283 (Utah App. 1996), the trial court had 
granted summary judgment on the issue of causation. The appellate court 
reversed, finding that the trial court had found facts and weighed evidence, "which 
was inappropriate in consider a motion for summary judgment Id, 1292. This 
case does not support the defendants position. 
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CONCLUSION 
"Proximate cause is a factual issue that generally cannot be resolved as a 
matter of law," and because it is a factual issue appeals courts "refuse to take it 
from the jury if there is any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could infer 
causation." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). This case is no 
exception. 
Wherefore, plaintiffs pray that the court reverse the trial court's Order 
Granting Summary Judgment, and remand the case to the district court for jury 
trial. 
Dated this 9th day of February, 2012. 
•t 
Samuel G. Draper, attorney for plaintiffs 
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